Tuesday, May 12, 2015

Beyond Designated Hitters

When the Minnesota Vikings host the San Diego Chargers in Week # 3 of the NFL season this September and then travel to Denver to face the Broncos in Week # 4, they will play by exactly the same rules that will be in effect for Weeks # 1 and # 2, when the Purple Gang takes on the San Francisco 49ers and the Detroit Lions.  The Vikes, Niners and Motor City Kitties are in the National Football Conference of the NFL, while the Bolts (SD) and the Orange Crush (DEN) are in the American Football Conference.  Don't matter none!  All sixteen NFC teams and all sixteen AFC teams use a uniform set of rules, regardless of where or when the game is being played.

The same principle holds true for the National Basketball Association and the National Hockey League.  When each opponent comes from a different conference, there are no special rules of order for that game.
 
Not so baseball.

Even the most casual fan knows that in Major League Baseball, games played in American League parks use a designated hitter ("DH"), whereas games played in which the home team is from the National League do not.  Recently there has been some discussion about whether that discrepancy might change in the near future when the current Collective Bargaining Agreement expires.  So far this season the Twins have played every game under AL rules, but that will change one week from today, May 19, when they visit the Pittsburgh Pirates.  In honor of our home town heroes' lofty achievement of playing over .500 ball at this point of the young season, let's consider what some of the DH/no DH ramifications are.

Automatic Outs.  The most obvious difference pertaining to the American League incorporating the DH is that you don't have what usually amounts to an automatic out.  In other words, pitchers don't bat; the DH bats for them.  With the exception of a half dozen hurlers like the San Francisco Giants' Madison Baumgardner, pitchers are notoriously poor batters.  They make their living with their arms, not their bats.  Consequently, many pitchers give, at best, a half-hearted effort to become good hitters.  If they can lay down a good bunt once in awhile, they feel they've done their job at the plate.  If you check the box scores from NL home games, you'll see that managers almost always relegate pitchers to the "9 hole" in the batting order.  The Cubs' manager Joe Maddon and retired Hall Of Fame manager Tony LaRussa are the two skippers most likely to deviate from that tradition.  Imagine the ignominy of being a position player who bats behind a pitcher slotted into the 8 hole!
 
Double Switches.  Former Twins manager Tom Kelly used to make fun of his NL counterparts by telling the press that he wasn't sure he understood "the complexity" of making the maneuver known as the "double switch."  Of course TK was kidding because, first of all, he has a sharp baseball mind, and secondly, it really isn't all that complicated, even though some elitist NL fans look upon the double switch as rocket science.  A double switch, which you'll see only in National League games, occurs simultaneously with a pitching change, when a manager removes not only his pitcher but also one of the eight other fielders (aka position players), and replaces them with a different pitcher and a new fielder who swap spots in the batting order.
 
Let's say that the Twins are playing in an NL park, and the last three places in the Twins batting order are:
 
7. CF Jordan Schafer
8. SS Danny Santana
9. P  Brian "The Dunce" Duensing
 
In the top of the 7th inning, Schafer makes the third out.  Now in the bottom of the 7th with two outs, manager Paul Molitor decides to bring in Casey Fien to pitch to the next batter.  If Fien gets the third out, he is due to bat second in the top of the 8th.  Assuming Molitor feels that Fien is not a good hitter, Molitor pulls the ol' double switch by (i) removing Schafer at the same time he pulls Duensing, (ii) replacing Schafer with Eddie Rosario in center field, and (iii) inserting Fien in the "7-hole" and Rosario in the "9-hole."  It's important to note that Schafer is the most likely position player to be removed as part of the double switch because he made the last out.
 
Following the double switch, the last three places in the Twins batting order look like this:
 
7. P Casey Fien
8. SS Danny Santana
9. CF Eddie Rosario
 
Thus, the first two batters in the top of the 8th will be Santana and Rosario instead of Santana and Fien.  Fien's spot in the lineup won't come up for awhile, if at all.  This saves Molitor from having to use a pinch hitter for Fien in the 8th inning, which has the double benefit of (i) preserving the bench strength strength for possible future pinch hitting scenarios, and (ii) allowing Fien to pitch in the bottom of the 8th, thus preserving the bullpen.
 
One thing to keep in mind about double switches:  The manager has to tell the home plate umpire that he's using the double switch before the manager crosses the foul line and goes to the mound.  Once the manager crosses the line, it's too late to pull off the double dipper.
 
Using a double switch isn't always a good move.  For one thing, a manager won't use it unless the pitcher is one of the first three batters scheduled to hit in the next half-inning.  Also, a manager is hesitant to remove a good fielder late in the game.  In the example above, if manager Molitor deems Schafer a much better center fielder than Rosario, he might not remove Schafer as part of a double switch when he takes out Duensing.  Instead, he might choose a different position player to remove, or he might opt not to use the double switch at all.
 
Roster Ramifications.  Because National League games call for the pitcher to be in the batting order, it follows that you need more than just a couple of worthy pinch hitters on your bench.  Put another way, you need more potential pinch hitters on your bench in an NL game than you do in an AL game.  The result of having more potential pinch hitters on your team means that a team will probably restructure its pitching staff.  The pitchers who are trimmed from the twenty-five man roster are typically # 5 starters and long relievers.  Thus, a team might go from having five starting pitchers, two long relievers and five short relievers to four starters, one long reliever and seven short relievers.
 
Pitcher vs. Batter Strategy.  In a National League game you are much more likely to see pitchers "pitching around" certain batters, or even issuing more intentional walks.  If the # 7 or # 8 batter comes up, especially with two outs, a pitcher might be more conscious of avoiding throwing the ball over the heart of the plate, because even if that batter draws a walk (i.e., "pitching around" the batter), the next one or two batters following in the order are usually weak sticks, one of whom will produce the third out.  You don't see that as much in the AL, which typically has bona fide hitters throughout the batting order.
 
In the later innings of a close game, many managers like to employ a "lefty against lefty" or "righty against righty" matchup to increase the odds of getting an out.  Let's call those desired matchups "LRMs."  The theory, easily provable through statistics, is that left handed pitchers have a better success rate against left handed batters, and right handed pitchers fare better against right handed batters.  The main reason is that curve balls and sliders break away from (instead of into) a batter of the same "handedness" as the pitcher.  Former Twins manager Ron Gardenhire was notorious for using up his bullpen for the purpose of getting his desired LRMs.   In an effort to make it tougher for the opposing manager to use LRMs, Gardy would also arrange his batting order to avoid two batters in a row swinging from the same side of the plate.  (Exception: when Justin Morneau played for the Twins, he and Joe Mauer, both lefties, often batted in the 3 and 4 holes.)  In National League games, however, you don't see managers pulling their pitchers as often as their AL counterparts do in order to get a LRM.  The reason, as alluded to above, is that the manager in an NL game always has to be aware of when his pitcher is due to bat in subsequent innings.  Whenever a pitcher is due to bat (except very early in a low scoring game), the opportunity to lift him for a pinch hitter trumps the desired LRM.  The manager only has so many pitching substitutions he can make before he'll run out of pitchers.  Contrast this with managers in AL games.  They don't have to worry about pinch hitting for the pitcher, so they are more likely to execute the LRM.
 
Bean Balls.  Thankfully, modern baseball does not have as many bean ball wars as the old days, when the majority of squads seemed to have headhunters on their pitching staff.  You will hardly ever see it in the NL, because the pitcher who launches a bean ball is probably going to have to bat at some point.  In the AL, retaliation to a bean ball is usually executed against the first batter in the next half-inning, whom you might call "an innocent bystander."
 
The Overriding Consideration.  Probably the most important thing to remember is that the strategic philosophies for NL play vs. AL play are, generally, quite different.  If you have an extra five minutes, I recommend to you a rereading of my April 22, 2013 post, Manufacturing Runs.  Your assignment is to git'r done before the Twins take on the Buccos one week from today in beautiful PNC Park.     

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