Florida cop wannabe George Zimmerman was acquitted of murder and manslaughter charges by his criminal trial jury on Saturday. Although my unfailing humility nearly keeps me from doing this, I must point out that I correctly predicted that outcome here back on June 2, 2012 (Three Defendants Will Walk) and again on June 13, 2012 (Roger The Dodger). Just think of all the money the state of Florida could have saved if only they had consulted with me before spending millions prosecuting the case. I know the public demanded a trial, but given the facts revealed through the media, I did not foresee any way the prosecution could meet the criminal trial standard of having to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It didn't hurt that Zimmerman's defense team was outstanding.
As proof of my modesty I will not remind you that, in addition to the Zimmerman case, I was also correct on last year's John Edwards corruption case and Roger Clemens obstruction of justice case, as descibed in the two posts cited above. Just don't mention my January 7, 2013 prediction of the Alabama-Notre Dame National Championship Game (Take The Ten, Bet On Green).
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Tonight's main attraction is the Major League Baseball All Star Game, to be played in the new home of the New York Mets, Citi Field. In spite of its well-documented faults, baseball's version of an all star game is the best, if for no other reason than it is the only one of the four major sports in which all star defense is played with the same amount of professionalism that a fan would witness in a regular season game. Therefore, with apologies in advance to readers who don't give a rat's patootie about baseball, I deem it appropriate and timely to offer one more missive about my favorite sport. (Full disclosure: I already have a draft of yet another baseball-related post in the hopper, so my apology is not really heartfelt.)
I decided long ago that when I attend a game, I will resist the temptation to throw in my two cents when a nearby fan loudly expounds on something happening on the field, even if that fan is, in my view, misinformed. The sun will still rise in the east the next day, regardless of what that nincompoop sitting behind me says to his ten year old son. However, my kinder and gentler approach does not apply to talking heads who get paid to analyze. A lot of other baseball fans apparently feel the same way, as former Big Red Machine second baseman (and Hall Of Famer) Joe Morgan was forced out of a network job by disgruntled fans who could not bear to hear Joe, week after week, utter one falsehood after another. (Plus, he was dull!) One of the great mysteries surrounding the sport is how preposterous analyst Tim McCarver, a two-time World Series winning catcher for the St. Louis Cardinals, manages to keep his job on Fox Sports. He is prone to offer such gems as, "It is well established that if a right-handed batter connects on a 3 & 2 slider, the ball will tail away from the right fielder." No wonder fans set up "FireJoeMorgan" and "FireTimMcCarver" web sights. Joe is long gone, and this is Tim's last year. Ostensibly Tim is retiring. In any event, good riddance, Tim!
Whether it be from paid analysts, fans in the stands, or elsewhere, baseball is replete with "known facts" that ain't quite factual. In honor of the Twins' Joe Mauer, the $23 million a year catcher who wears # 7 and is starting for the American League tonight, here are seven myths about America's favorite pastime.
Myth # 1: Stick the stiff in right field. When I was a kid, the coaches always put the poorest player in right field, on the theory that a weak glove can be hidden out in the south forty, where no one ever hits the ball. I later realized that the practice is not limited to youth baseball, as many managers at the high school level and above follow the same practice.
There is more to playing right field than shagging a ball or two during a nine inning game. Many Major League stadia, including Fenway Park (Boston Red Sox), Comerica Park (Detroit Tigers) and Minute Maid Park (Houston Astros), require the right fielder to cover a lot more ground than the left fielder. (By the way, take a peek at this cool website: www.andrewclem.com. It shows the dimensions of all MLB parks since the early 1900's.) One of the most underrated aspects of the game is what is known as "defending the first base runner." In my June 6, 2012 post (The Art Of The Double Play) I noted that a handful of current right fielders are known for their strong throwing ability. This not only keeps base hits down the line from turning into doubles, but keeps the runner who started at first base from getting to third on a single. As they say in constitutional law, the right fielder's throwing prowess has a "chilling effect" on that base runner and his third base coach. That is important because, unlike a runner at second, a runner on third can score on a balk, a wild pitch, a passed ball, an infield base hit, an infield chopper, a sac fly, a suicide squeeze, a safety squeeze or a one-base error. Plus, there is a slight chance of stealing home.
Think about this: The two infielders who are most often used as relay men are the shortstop and the second baseman, and in almost every case, the shortstop has the stronger arm. Because of that, shortstops can go out farther to take a throw from the left fielder than a second baseman can afford to go to take a throw from a right fielder. That is another reason most managers will put the outfielder with the cannon in right, and the weaker arm in left.
Myth # 2: The catcher is the defensive captain, and therefore has the right-of-way on pop-ups, especially foul pop-ups. First of all, although the catcher is, arguably, the defensive captain who signals most defensive plays in advance, he is the last guy you want catching a pop-up if another player has at least an equal opportunity to get under it. On any fair ball pop-up hit in front of the mound, the pitcher is supposed to take charge on appointing an infielder to make the play. On any fair ball pop-up behind the mound, that duty falls to the shortstop unless the ball is more or less coming down directly toward one of the other infielders. On any foul ball where the choice is between the corner infielder or the catcher, the corner infielder should take it because (i) they have bigger glove pockets, (ii) the ball is not spinning backwards away from them like it is for the catcher, and (iii) the corner infielders do not have to deal with gear.
Myth # 3: An infield is either playing back, or it isn't. That may not qualify as a myth, but it is, shall we say, imprecise. Generally there are four depths a manager might pick from to position his infield. Normal depth means that the infielders are back near, if not on, the outfield grass, i.e., on the edge of the infield skin. Double play depth still has the infielders behind the base paths, but closer in than normal depth. To turn a double play, the ball has to be fielded more quickly than normal depth would allow, and the middle infielders have to be closer to the second base bag to enable them to be in position to take the throw for the force. If the infield is in (or "up") that means the four are each up to the infield grass, hoping the ball is hit right at one of them to permit a quick throw to the plate. Finally, there is medium depth, commonly called "half way," which has the infielders in front of the base path, but farther from the plate than the "in/up" position. As all you physics and geometry scholars know, the closer in the infield plays, the easier it is for the batter to get a base hit, because there is less reaction time and it's harder to play the angles for a fielder who is up.
When I am at a game, I like to see which depth the manager chooses to set his infield. This is an aspect of the game that television does not show enough. Early in a game, he may decide to concede a run by playing his infield back even though there is a runner at third and less than two out. If the same situation presented itself late in a close game, he might bring the infield in to cut down the runner trying to score on an infield grounder. With runners at the corners and less than two out early in the game, most teams will play the infield at double play depth, willing to give up a run (if there is no one out) in exchange for two outs. That is called "avoiding the big inning." When a manager plays his infield half way, he is hedging his bets.
In addition to the four depths described above, there are combo platter hybrids, such as "corners up," which has only the first and third basemen playing in, and infield shifts, where there might be three infielders on the same side of the diamond. When left handed Adam Dunn of the White Sox bats against the Twins and several other teams, the second baseman looks more like a shallow right fielder, because Dunn runs like his feet are in cement. One novel concept regarding infield shifts is employed by manager Joe Maddon of the Tampa Bay Rays. When his team shifts by placing three infielders to the right of second base, he leaves his shortstop as the only man on the left side. In other words, as you look out from the plate, the third baseman is to the right of the shortstop. I think that's brilliant, because his shortstop has far more range than the third baseman, so he (instead of the third baseman) is left to patrol the entire left side of the infield.
Myth # 4: A good catcher will totally block the plate to keep a runner from scoring. I must confess that I was not set straight on this myth until this season, when I learned something new from former Twins catcher Tim Laudner. He said that when a catcher is anticipating a play at the plate, he should give the incoming runner a very small glimpse of the plate, so that the runner has something to shoot for without intentionally attempting to bowl over the catcher. The catcher is still blocking the plate, but not entirely obfuscating it. The catcher, who is wearing protective equipment (including his mask which he should not have removed!), maintains the advantage, plus more often than not he is the bigger player. Also, a runner is more likely to go into a head first slide -- posing less danger to the catcher -- if he can see a piece of the plate when he's getting close.
I am happy to report that, no thanks to me, none of the catchers I coached was ever killed by an incoming base runner. I wish I had heard Tim's instructional back in 1971, when I coached my first team. But then again, Tim would have been just thirteen years old at that time, the same age as the kids I was coaching, so I probably wouldn't have paid him much heed.
Myth # 5: A perfect throw from an outfielder to the plate arrives on the fly. If you thought that, go directly to jail. Do not pass Go; do not collect $200. A perfect throw from an outfielder arrives on exactly one hop. If the ball hops more than once it will be too late to nail the runner. If the ball arrives on the fly it is harder for the catcher to make the play because, for one thing, long throws tend to curve. Also, they are harder for the outfielder to control. Fielding a short bounce is an easier play than trying to catch a ball on the fly after it's traveled over a hundred fifty feet.
Two other considerations about long throws from the outfield. First, if the outfielder's goal is to have his throw reach the plate on the fly, there is less chance of him hitting the cut-off man. Unless it is the walk-off winning run coming in or there is no other base runner to defend, the outfielder needs to have a throw that the cut-off man can reach if signaled to do so by the catcher. Second, if the walk-off winning run will score on a sac fly, the outfielders should position themselves no deeper than the distance they can throw to the plate on one hop. Playing any deeper than that is pointless.
Myth # 6: If a relief pitcher wasn't used in a game, he should be available to pitch the next day. Each pitcher is different, but as a rule of thumb it takes a relief pitcher anywhere from twenty to twenty-five pitches in the bullpen to get warm. This does not include pre-game long toss, playing catch in front of the bullpen mound before actually working on his pitches from the bullpen rubber, or the eight warmup pitches he is allowed to throw from the diamond's mound. Barring extra innings, each pitcher in the pen has a defined role, such as long relief, middle relief, set-up (i.e., seventh or eighth inning), or closer. If the starter gets in trouble in the fourth inning, the long reliever knows that when the phone rings it will be his "get ready" signal. If the starter lasts until the eighth -- a highly unlikely occurrence for the Twins -- and then requires relief, the set up guy will be the one called. Pitchers are accustomed to routine. In view of all the above, if a pitcher is asked to warm up a second time in the same game, he either needs to go in then, or else he is done for the day. If a relief pitcher warms up twice but does not go in the game, for purposes of determining whether he's available for the next game it's treated the same as if he had gone in. After all, by that time he would have thrown forty or fifty pitches in the pen. The point is this: You can't tell by looking at a box score from yesterday's game whether a relief pitcher will be available to pitch today. Just because he didn't appear in the game does not mean he will be ready and able to go today.
Myth # 7: A relief pitcher's won/loss record and ERA (earned runs per nine innings) are the best measuring sticks for determining his effectiveness. While it's true that those two stats are the ones most often shown on the TV screen or announced on the radio, the two most telling stats for a relief pitcher are his WHIP and the percentage of his inherited runners he has allowed to score. For set-up relievers, who are often brought in to pitch with men on base when the game is on the line, I also want to know their ratio of strikeouts to innings pitched. Sometimes only a strikeout (or a harmless pop up) will do. If the strikeouts to innings pitched ratio is equal to or better than 1 to 1, that is excellent. By way of contrast, closers are more liable to start an inning, so where that's the case I place more reliance on the WHIP.
"WHIP" means walks and hits allowed per innings pitched. The trouble with WHIP stats, and the reason why won/loss records and ERAs are used more than WHIP during broadcasts and telecasts, is that the difference between a good WHIP and a poor WHIP can be a matter of tenths of a point. For example, a good WHIP would be around 1.1 and under, while a poor WHIP would be around 1.4 and above. That small margin might be too much for a lot of casual baseball fans to digest.
ERA for most relief pitchers is not that predictive, especially with teams that have managers who like to use six or seven pitchers in a close game. There is too much reliance on the subsequent pitcher being able to keep his inherited runners from scoring. A high ERA for a relief pitcher (except, I would argue, closers) can be deceiving, because once he is pulled from the game he is reliant on his incoming colleague to hold things at bay. A good example of what I'm addressing occurred in the Twins' June 19 game against the White Sox. Brian Duensing came on in the eighth inning to relieve Ryan Pressly with runners on second and third and two outs. Duensing was being asked to retire just one batter, Adam Dunn. Dunn hit Duensing's second pitch to center for a single, knocking in both runs, whereupon Duensing was removed in favor of Josh Roenicke. The two runs Duensing allowed were charged to Pressly, and since Dunn never came around to score, Duensing's ERA was not affected one iota.
Won/loss record is useful and instructive for starting pitchers, who by rule must complete five innings to qualify for getting credit for a win. But there is too much luck involved to rely on that stat for relievers. A lot of the same rationale used in connection with ERA for relievers also applies to W/L. Theoretically, a relief pitcher can get credit for a win without ever throwing a pitch. He could pick a runner off first for the third out before delivering to the plate. Then, if his team takes the lead and never surrenders it, Presto! He is the winning pitcher. Another example is a closer getting credit for a win after a blown save. Say a closer blows the lead in the top of the ninth, yet the manager leaves him in to complete the half-inning. If his team wins the game in the bottom of the ninth, the closer gets the W, even though he failed to accomplish his primary function, viz., getting the save.
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